Contrary to the common view, the old Roman aphorism divide et impera (divide and rule) did not originate from England. Indeed, we do not know where it sprang from as it has a long, convoluted past, more or less like the early Islamic history. Greeks accredit themselves for contriving it, while Romans praise their ancestors as the ones who devised the strategy. Not standing too behind in the queue, the old Middle Eastern authors too hint towards conceiving it on their own. In short, from Philips of Macedonia to Josephus Flavius, there are many who can claim the proprietary rights on the idea. If true — which it is — then why are the British still credited for its birth? I think the perception developed because, in part, they benefitted from the policy the most while taking over the subcontinent, one piece at a time. And in part because of our own oblivion we just did not comprehend what was happening to us when it was happening. The basic tenet of the axiom is easy to follow: first you identify the real source of discordance within a given community. Then based on that issue you create a rift between its different factions. Divided, as the rift between them grows wider, they start fighting with each other. And, the more they fight, the more they strengthen you — the enemy — whether they realise it or not. The result? They lose, you win. But in order to recognise the true sore spot, and then to implement the rule successfully, you must know your opponent — his traditions, his fears, his strengths, his weaknesses, his insecurities –really well. If you don’t, you are doomed to lose, which is what has happened to us every time when we attempted to put the rule into practice. Thanks to our policy makers who turn a golden rule into garbage. For example, a long time before the current operation in Karachi where seven policemen were killed after two and a half years of relentless campaign against terrorism, Pakistan army had launched a grand operation against the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) to eradicate organised crime from the city. Altaf Hussain, fearful of being incarcerated, just before the exercise had fled out of Pakistan, and applied for political exile in the UK. While trying to find a safe place for himself, he could not, of course, take all the MQM workers along with him, many of whom ‘disappeared’ soon not to be seen ever again, their mothers still missing them even after 20 years, their sisters celebrating their birthdays in their absence. The disappearance of hundreds (if not thousands) of MQM workers warned the Urdu speaking community about a problem that lay beneath the facade of reviving peace of the city. They feared it was to undermine their political identity. Let me also remind you about the charges against the party. What were those? Same as today that the MQM is involved in organised crime; that the MQM has connections with the Indian intelligence agency, RAW; that the MQM wish to divide Pakistan and create a small state of its own, and that Altaf Hussain is an enemy agent. State-sponsored television programmes showed the torture cells and the maps of the ‘new state’. But the problem, even after months of propaganda against the MQM, remains unsolved without really affecting the popularity of the MQM. What was our solution to lure the MQM supporters away from Hussain? You are right: divide and rule! We carved the MQM Haqqiqui out of the Hussain-led MQM, dividing it into two factions. As expected, the two groups — one with our backing — began to fight with each other, converting their political rivalry into a gang war, each faction geared up to seize control of a territory. According to the rulebook, everything moved in our favour, except that it did not in reality. The ‘foreign hand’ that was supposed to divide the party only boosted the image of Hussain as the ‘saviour’ of Urdu speaking people. Afaq Ahmed, the leader of the MQM-Haqqiqi, on the other hand, came across as an ordinary criminal, a ‘traitor’. The Result? The MQM went on to win every election since 1992 in which it has participated until 2013, and the Haqquiqi faction got maybe one or two seats. The lesson that we learnt from the fiasco should have been that the people of Karachi may not like Hussain and decide on their own to vote him out, but if they perceive a conspiracy being hatched against him to dissuade his supporters, they will rally behind him every time. Did we learn that lesson then? Of course if we had, Mustafa Kamal would never have returned from Dubai to active politics. The new attempt in the form of his Pak Sar Zameen Party, as unsuccessful as it appears after its first and failed rally on Sunday, is not any different from the formation of the MQM Haqqiqui, and is being viewed as an unwanted intervention as its older version was viewed. What about Kamal’s personal charisma as a successful mayor of Karachi? Why wouldn’t it work? Sure, he is a much better candidate than Afaq Ahmed. The community likes him on a personal level too. In fact, people took a lot of pride in his performance as the mayor, but they do not trust his agenda when he stands against Altaf Hussain. The writer is a US-based freelance columnist. He tweets at @KaamranHashmi and can be reached at skamranhashmi@gmail.com