The co-relation between national interests and state security has never received such scholarly attention before. Plans for operationalising the Special Security Division (SSD) for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have been held up by civil-military interface. The success of CPEC is dependent on a unified strategic policy and insulation of the threat scenario. The internal security parameters and its demands of external security dynamics are vital and would urgently need to be resolved. There is hence a need to analyse whether a co-relation between the civil-military leadership exists. The civil-military differences are not limited to CPEC though it seems to have become another source of tension between the civilian and military leaderships. Much like the troubled National Counter Terrorism Authority, security is a major concern for entire CPEC, which faces threats from both regional and extra-regional players. The government had earlier denied the military a formal role in CPEC’s apex governing body and envisioned the creation of a separate ministry or CPEC Development Authority to deal exclusively with CPEC. Whereas a Senate committee had suggested that control of the project be handed over to the Council of Common Interests (CCI), which oversees matters involving the provinces. In the middle of all this army has already created the SSD to provide security cover to CPEC-related projects. Chinese, on other hand, have been insisting that Pakistan government formally include the army to ensure security of the project, and have urged political leaders to address their differences in order to create favourable conditions for the completion of the project. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has been until now weighing pros and cons of the Chinese proposal without a formal decision. Army ownership through the SSD will only help ensure smooth implementation of CPEC, but the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) wants to sell CPEC as one of its winning trophies during its campaign for the next general election, and would like to keep it firmly within its control. It is feared that the issue, if not resolved at the earliest, could potentially affect CPEC timelines. Difference of opinion is acceptable in democracy and CPEC is no exception. When CPEC was initially introduced, every mainstream political party supported it, including the ruling PMLN-N. However, the commitment turned to open concern when political parties from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan felt that the reservations of their provinces about CPEC were not being addressed. The debate between political parties became so intense that China felt it necessary to put out a statement urging parties to overcometheir differences. This naturally leads to the ways and means in which lack of clarity about national interests may impact Pakistan’s economic stability. At the outset, both the PML-N leadership and the army aims to identify this co-relation and hopes to draw a satisfactory compromise with respect to CPEC; however, the PML-N is unwilling to share CPEC control with the army. The status of Pakistan army’s potential is particularly relevant to CPEC’s future security prospects, both in traditional and non-traditional contexts. The country has faced external security problems from the day of its independence in August 1947, but its problems have compounded due to recent events in neighbouring Afghanistan and India affecting Pakistan’s internal andborder security. The strategic game changer project CPEC is the biggest ever investment for both China and Pakistan. It aims to connect the Gwadar port in south-western Pakistan to China’s north-western autonomous region of Xinjiang via a network of highways, railways and pipeline to transport oil and gas. By and large, construction costs are estimated at $46 billion, which is roughly 20 percent of Pakistan’s annual GDP. Besides transport, the corridor will provide Pakistan with telecommunications and energy infrastructure as well. The corridor will go a long way in making Pakistan a better-off and powerful entity than ever before. China could also be trying to find alternative trade routes to bypass the Malacca straits, presently the only maritime route China can use to access the Middle East, Africa and Europe. Apart from being long it can be blockaded in times of war. This may be the reason China is also pursuing an eastern corridor to the Bay of Bengal, expected to pass through parts of Myanmar, Bangladesh and possibly India. The security atmosphere inside Pakistan especially Balochistan poses numerous difficulties for CPEC. Starting from Kashgar, the project will pass through Gilgit-Baltistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, followed by Balochistan. For that, government has decided to install 10,000 army personnel under the command of a major-general, whose primary objective will be to safeguard Chinese engineers and guard the entire trade route. The deployment of army personnel along the North Channel has already begun. This shows that the civilian and military leaderships despite differences over foreign policy are on the same page when it comes to this strategically vital project. Between Gwadar and Kashgar the corridor passes through areas that are within striking range of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s insurgents. Until recently they controlled territory along Pakistan’s north-western border with Afghanistan, and hosted the largest concentration of Uighur militants outside China. They still have a presence in the border region, though their sanctuaries have been disrupted by a Pakistani military operation that began last June. Similarly, the separatist rebellion in Balochistan where the port of Gwadar is situated remains a threat, and India, allegedly, aims to increase its support for the rebels via Afghanistan with the deliberate aim of blocking the Chinese corridor. This is a crucial period for Pakistan. It is widely acknowledged that a high level of security is a prerequisite for sustainable CPEC development, and this is especially true in this current conflict situation. Pakistan’s history is rife with a civil-military conflict, and it has to end never more so than now, because it leaves unresolved the other problem inherent in the civil-military relationship: who decides and what they get to decide. Focus of civil-military relations should be to ensure shared responsibility. There is a ‘Goldilocks’ relationship between the civil-military dynamic, and both too-much and too-little would be more likely to lead to military ineffectiveness. The real issue, however, is whether we can still have a military that can voice its opinion and provide expertise when necessary. (Concluded) The writer is a professor of psychiatry and consultant forensic psychiatrist in the UK. He can be contacted at fawad_shifa@yahoo.com