On July 15, thousands of angry Turks gave armchair democrats around the world, including those in Pakistan, an object lesson in how to defend their democracies. The answer: by obsessively giving a damn. A deluge of civilians then overran the streets of Ankara and Istanbul in response to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s calls for resistance after a sector of Turkey’s powerful military mobilised a snap coup. Close to 250 soldiers and civilians died in the ensuing clashes before the rebels surrendered the following morning. Talking heads in Pakistan, meanwhile, mused with healthy dollops of mirth if any Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) voter would ever risk getting crushed by a bicycle, much less a tank, to save Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government. The rebels, marshalled by an alarming number of high-ranking officers of the Turkish army and air force, had proclaimed their goal was to protect democracy, ironically from the democratically elected Erdoðan. After briefly taking over Turkey’s official broadcaster, they released a statement explaining the coup was necessary to “reinstate constitutional order, human rights and freedom.” Reportedly lacking broad support from within the armed forces, the coup eventually failed, and over 6,000 soldiers and judges were booked for high treason. Erdoðan swiftly blamed the US-based cleric, and old friend-turned-nemesis, Fethullah Gulen for the coup, demanding the US extradite him. He also promised to “cleanse the virus from all state institutions,” a reference to Gulen partisans populating the various branches of government. In Turkey, as in Pakistan, the army attempting to depose a democratically elected government raises few eyebrows around the world, although Turkey has bucked the trend by sidestepping one for close to two decades. This period has coincided with the centre-right Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) years in power. There were, however, four military-led coups between 1960 and 1997, with the first one costing the incumbent prime minister his life. Moreover, the now viral term “deep state” is of Turkish origin, and first used to describe the shadowy fringe of the country’s military — “derin devlet” — with its long history of subverting democratic rule to uphold Kemalist principles. Though Erdoðan and the AKP have managed to avoid an outright, coordinated putsch for close to 14 years, it has not all been smooth sailing. The “Ergenekon Affair” of 2013 — a failed attempt by 200 ultra-nationalists to oust Erdogan — clearly demonstrated that the hardcore Kemalists in the army were itching to overthrow the AKP. The timing of the latest bid is significant in view of Turkey’s growing problems with extremism — partly the fallout of its role in the Syrian civil war –and the president’s aggressive campaign to centralise power that borders on tyranny. Experts in Turkish politics believe the army is miffed at Erdogan’s eagerness to throw the state further into the neighbouring war in Syria in support of Islamists battling President Bashar al-Assad.. His unwillingness to accept pro-Kurd parties in parliament is also blamed for reigniting tensions with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) after a two-year truce largely held. Erdogan, for his part, has doubled down on jailing critics of his regime, and instituted a three-month state of emergency. Earlier, in March, he had law enforcement raid the daily Zaman newspaper, dismissed the editor, and brought in new management that turned it into “a propaganda piece of the regime,” fumed Sevgi Akarcesme, the editor-in chief of sister publication of Zaman in English. Given his provocations, how did Erdoðan evade the military’s wrath for this long? Professor Richard Bulliet from Columbia University, an expert on Middle Eastern affairs, contends the AKP began life in the early 2000s as a genuine reformist movement that sought to expand on the army’s vision of Turkey. Erdoðan took the death penalty off the table in 2004 (something he now threatens to reintroduce in punishing the rebels), and as prime minister aided the passage of a draft of European Union (EU)-style laws that mollified the generals. Bulliet believes, “The big secret of Erdoðan in taming the military was that he appeared to be making progress in getting Turkey accepted into the EU, and the EU would not tolerate a coup.” This is no longer the case. Moreover, in view of Erdogan’s readiness to namedrop Gulen as the mastermind of the coup, there is clearly no love lost between the two Islamist leaders. In 2002, Gulen and his “Hizmet” movement — a network of worldwide NGO’s — were natural allies of the ascendant AKP in pushing the army out of politics and back to the barracks. Relations began to sour in 2011, however, as ambitions and egos collided. Erdoðan accused Gulen of running a parallel state by buying loyalties insides Turkey’s judiciary and police. Gulen parried by insinuating that Erdoðan and his family were neck deep in corruption. Indeed, in December last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin had level;ed similar charges against Erdogan, accusing his counterpart of benefitting from an illegal oil trade with areas held by Islamic State (IS). Still, something doesn’t smell right about the whole thing. Reuters reports that a scarcely believable 50,000 individuals ranging from educators to judges to soldiers have either been detained or purged from their positions following the failed coup. Moreover, besides the key plotter, ostensibly Turkey’s former air force chief, over 100 generals and admirals will face treason charges for conspiring against the state. The rebels, lest we forget, had access to prized military hardware including tanks and F-16’s. This begs the questions: was the Turkish central command in a food coma leading up to July 15? I bet that in Pakistan, a jawan (soldier) stationed in remote Khuzdar cannot skip two morning drills in a row without a superior officer taking note and requiring explanation. And yet here we are supposed to believe that the grand Turkish army, NATO’s second largest today and successor to the Ottoman’s feared “Janissary” corps, naively twiddled its thumbs while a plot of this magnitude was being scripted right under its nose? I call shenanigans. There is a long game being played here, and the events of July 15 were merely the opening set pieces to more dramatic chaos. Moving along this tangent, Turkey’s deep state will secretly cheer Erdoðan on in his new crusade to show the army who is the boss. The more ruthless he is in this endeavour, the greater the lay soldier will hate his guts and seek payback. US Secretary of State John Kerry, a former naval officer, probably senses this and recently warned Erdoðan to practice restraint in dealing with the rebels or risk ripping up Turkey’s NATO membership. For despite the appearance of strength, Erdoðan may in reality be slipping into quicksand. The writer is an Islamabad-based freelance journalist