Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent visit to Russia is an important development. First of all, it breaks the logjam in their relationship, which nosedived after a Russian plane was shot down last November for breaching Turkish air space for bombing raids on Syrian rebels. Moscow denied any violation of Turkish air space and demanded an apology. As the apology was not forthcoming, the relations between the two countries were virtually suspended thus adversely affecting Turkish economy. Russia stopped imports of fruit and other agricultural products, and tourism from Russia was halted. Similarly, grandiose projects like a gas pipeline and a nuclear power plant to be built in Turkey were suspended. Erdogan’s visit will now lead to a resumption of their suspended relationship, with prospects of closer ties between the two countries. It would seem that Erdogan was already having second thoughts, and was keen to repair the damage from the shooting of the Russian warplane. He had already expressed regret for the incident, as earlier demanded by Vladimir Putin. In the wake of the failed military coup in Turkey, President Putin’s prompt phone call expressing solidarity with President Erdogan was regarded as a “psychological boost” by the Turkish president, when it was most needed. Which in a way puts in context Erdogan’s initiative to revive his country’s strained relationship with Russia. While the Russian president was immediately forthcoming and supportive of Erdogan’s situation and apparently his crackdown on his internal enemies, the US and Europe have lately become critical of the sweeping nature of Erdogan’s suppression of all freedoms, using the coup as a blunt instrument to go after all his real and imagined enemies. And he feels let down because, in his view, his crackdown is indeed meant to protect democracy. Erdogan believes that the US and Europe are hypocritical in not appreciating and recognising that his enemies are indeed “terrorists” and that his campaign against them is on par with the west’s war on terrorism. And, in the case of the US, Erdogan feels even more aggrieved and betrayed that they are sheltering the cleric, Fethullah Gulen, who is said to be the mastermind behind the failed coup. His Hizmet movement is said to be working for the overthrow of Erdogan’s democratically elected government. And by refusing to extradite Gulen for his “terrorist” crimes, the US is complicit in the failed coup and all that Gulen and his supporters are hatching against the Erdogan government and Turkey’s democracy. Erdogan believes that he is not without leverage in seeking to forestall western criticism of his policies for failure to follow due legal processes. Both Putin and Erdogan find western criticism and values self-serving and hypocritical. They find themselves under western pressure to tailor their internal politics and system to dovetail with western concept and practice of democracy as a universal system. Even though Turkey is a NATO ally, Ankara feels let down when subjected to criticism for its tough internal crackdown after its democratically elected government came close to be overthrown. And indeed, as the Erdogan government sees it, all this time the architect of all the conspiracies, Gulen, is safely ensconced in the United States and acting with impunity. The Turkish government is seeking Gulen’s extradition, but the US is refusing to hand him over even after President Erdogan made a direct request to President Obama. Therefore, as Ankara sees it, this is not how friends and allies are supposed to act. In the same way but in a different context, Putin sees Russia subjected to comprehensive sanctions for safeguarding its sovereign interests from an advancing NATO alliance by seeking to coopt Ukraine into EU and, likely, into NATO. On the face of it, there is no agreement between them on specific issues that rile Turkey and Russia against the west. But there appears to be a shared sense of outrage over western hypocrisy and double standards. Russia is treated as a pariah, and Turkey fears that it might be heading in that direction for refusing to ‘behave’ according to western norms. Turkey would very much like its western allies, particularly the United States, to become part of its crusade against the Kurds that it regards as a bigger enemy than IS. But they happen to be the US’ principal ally on the ground against IS. It is only recently that Turkey has hardened its policy against IS. Otherwise, it has been allowing jihadis and weapons to pass through its borders into Syria. Erdogan has sought all this time to bring down the Bashar al-Assad regime, and was unhappy when the United States didn’t take the opportunity to bomb Assad regime out of existence when it crossed Obama’s ‘red line’ with the use of chemical weapons on its citizens. And when Russians intervened to save Assad with their bombing sorties, it was then than Erdogan ordered the shooting of the Russian plane putting Russian-Turkish relations in serious jeopardy. Even though the process of repair and revival has seemingly begun, there is no indication that Turkey and Russia might sort out their serious differences on Syria policy. In other words, the apparent improvement in Moscow-Ankara relations appears tentative rather than substantive. While the imagery created by Erdogan’s Moscow visit is useful internally in both countries as having alternative options, their real value, as of now, lacks depth. The resumption of economic relations will marginally help Turkey but it cannot afford to risk its overall relationship with the US and Europe. Erdogan seems to believe he has more cards to play, as he did with slowing down the exodus of refugees from Syria and elsewhere into Europe. However, Ankara is unhappy at the ‘ingratitude’ of the EU, even though they have reportedly paid Turkey over four billion dollars for its services. The promised visa-free travel for Turks doesn’t appear to have materialised. And considering that Europe is critical of Erdogan’s no-holds-barred repression of his ‘enemies’ in the country, it doesn’t look Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership is likely to make any advance. On the face of it, Turkey is not making much headway in enlisting the US and European support on a whole range of issues that it considers important. All that has led President Erdogan to believe that he might be able use his Russian card to create the necessary space to deal with the US and Europe. But there is one problem. While Putin has been able to create a larger than life image for Russia by intervening in Ukraine and in Syria, Russia is no Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. Although it is the second largest nuclear power in the world, its economy is in rather bad shape from falling oil prices compounded by comprehensive western sanctions. In that sense, it is a poor counterweight to the west, if that is what Erdogan is aiming. Even as Ankara is trying to play the Russian card as evidenced by Erdogan’s recent visit, there are reports that Ankara was insisting that it didn’t signal a fundamental shift in Turkey’s foreign policy. The writer is a senior journalist and academic based in Sydney, Australia. He can be reached at sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au