To begin with, let me state again that Pakistan is now a nation at war, a war that is not confined to its borders or with an identifiable enemy but one that targets all its people anywhere, one that is being fought with an infinitesimally small percentage of its own misguided citizenry, occasionally with support from external enemies. The small percentage might be infinitesimal in number but is committed and, due to violence, is more visible than its numbers merit. Most insurgencies have thrived on popular support and terrorise only the few who do not support it. The insurgency in Pakistan, on the other hand, uses terror indiscriminately to increase its support base. While there are socio-economic issues that could suffice as complaints to nurture an insurgency, these issues serve merely as background to our insurgents who seek to create political space for themselves through the use of force. There are two distinct dimensions to this war. One dimension is against insurgents in the tribal areas and Balochistan. Operations there are Counterinsurgency Operations (CIOs), a purely military function being conducted entirely by the military. The other dimension, urban terrorism, complements the first. Insurgents infiltrate large cities and terrorise citizens indiscriminately to increase pressure on the incumbent government. Counter Urban Terrorism (CUT) operations are essentially a policing function, conducted by policing agencies. When necessary, these might be supported by military agencies. Both dimensions are heavily dependent on the intelligence agencies. Obviously, whenever security forces are gaining ground in one dimension of this war, the insurgents up the ante in the other dimension. What is more, since the insurgents are not a monolithic organisation but instead a hydra-headed one, if one prong of the insurgency is targeted, the other prong increases its activities. Until recently, this strategy of the insurgents was successful and pressure on the elected government was unrelenting. As I have stated in earlier articles, the incumbent Pakistani government’s stated position, favouring a negotiated settlement with the insurgent Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), even from a position of weakness, merely emboldened the insurgents. It was not until June this year when, as a consequence of the attack on Karachi airport, that the government finally listened to military reason and decided to support a full-scale military operation in the tribal areas, North Waziristan specifically. Pakistan is fortunate that, at this critical juncture, its security forces, both military and policing as well as intelligence agencies, have understood the strategy of the insurgents. Furthermore, intelligence agencies had not been sitting idle and had gained information about sleeper cells in the cities as well. Consequently, when Operation Zarb-e-Azb took off, it was multi-dimensional and multi-pronged, and simultaneous CUT operations based on reliable intelligence commenced in major cities. Resultantly, complementary efforts by insurgents in cities have been few and far between. This is why, when tragedy finally struck at Wagah, on the Indo-Pakistan border, it was a tragedy that had been waiting to occur, killing 62 and injuring scores more. The drama played out twice a day at Wagah is, to my knowledge, the most comical farce played out by two belligerent militaries. However, while it might seem like idiocy to a few, it serves a purpose for hero worshippers on both sides of the border. On both sides, the ceremony is well attended by ordinary folk starved of entertainment. Nationalists, one and all, stretch across all divides: ethnic, linguistic, religious, sectarian, colour, caste and creed. For Taliban apologists like some in our incumbent government and the bulk of Imran Khan’s party, this incident has finally left them incapable of any semblance of an apology. It has driven home, even to apologists, that the TTP views the entire citizenry of Pakistan through the same tinted glasses of ‘the enemy’. Five kilograms of explosives were used to detonate hundreds of ball bearings to target a maximum number of people. Fortunately, alert security personnel prevented the suicide bomber from reaching the parade ground, though he had penetrated the first two check posts. Had he gotten to the ground, he would have successfully targeted the security personnel of both countries, leaving us embarrassed by another international incident that could also have multiplied Indian belligerence. All successful terrorist attacks are intelligence failures to a greater or lesser degree. The real problem is that, while failures of intelligence agencies are very visible, their successes can seldom be made public. Only the percipient will note how few have been the suicide attacks occurring since the commencement of Operation Zarb-e-Azb and, from that fact, conclude that there have been numerous successes in CUT operations due to accurate intelligence. In conclusion, I wish to draw the reader’s attention to a fact that, tragically, has not been highlighted by the media as much as it deserves to be. On November 4, the day after the attack at Wagah, the evening ceremony was attended by an even larger throng of Pakistani citizens than had attended the day earlier. The message to the TTP was writ large: if such attacks are intended to scare us, they are not succeeding. It pains me to see how few of us consider the silent courage of these brave soldiers-without-uniform in our country, the likes of 15-year-old Aitzaz Hassan, men, women and children of all ages. I salute them. The writer is a freelance columnist