In the context of the history of Pakistan and India, there is still a moot point: if the Indian National Congress (INC) had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, what would have been the contours of both Pakistan and India today? In the ‘long term’ part of the plan, the provinces of united India were to be divided into three groups: Group A consisting of six provinces (Madras, Bombay, Utter Pradesh, Bihar, Central Province and Orissa); Group B consisting of four provinces (Punjab, North Western Frontier Province, Sindh and Balochistan); and Group C consisting of two provinces (Bengal and Assam). In a way, when All India Muslim League (AIML) accepted the plan, it postponed the demand of a separate Muslim state raised in the Lahore Resolution on August 14, 1940. In the acceptance of the plan, there were two gains for the AIML: first, the future state of Pakistan would be based on the provinces having Muslim majority population such as the provinces in the Group B and C of the plan; and second, the British government had acceded to the Muslim dream of Pakistan that the Muslims saw in 1940. However, in the acceptance of the plan, there were two losses to the AIML: first, the Muslims living in the Hindu majority provinces such as the provinces in the Group A of the plan were excluded from living with other Muslims; and second, the Muslims did not immediately gain Pakistan. The plan also said: “The constitution of the Union and of the Groups would contain a provision whereby any province could, by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of ten years and at ten yearly intervals thereafter… Provinces would be free to form Groups with executives and legislatures, and each Group could determine the Provincial subjects to be taken in common.” The language of this part of the plan showed that the British government wanted a consensus based division (or unity) and not an unplanned and enforced one. Secondly, the British government wanted a smooth transition of power. Earlier, the Lahore Resolution had said: “Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute ‘Independent States’ in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.” In this paragraph of the Resolution, a point is clear: the Muslims of India thought that the constitutional protection of their rights was not possible without the division of united India (and having a separate homeland, whether it consisted of one state or multiple states). After the Resolution, the AIML strived to remove the ambiguity surrounding the word ‘Independent States’ contained in the resolution. In 1941, at the Madras session of the AIML, a resolution was passed which stated, “Everyone should clearly understand that we are striving for one independent and sovereign Muslim state.” However, in a way, the Cabinet Mission Plan disagreed with this explanation and remained focused on translating the meaning of the Northwestern and Eastern Zones of India in the context of Muslim majority provinces. The plan used the word ‘province’ and not ‘unit’ or ‘area’ (and the word ‘group’ and not ‘zones) as written in the Lahore Resolution. Hence was the existence of the Group B and C in the plan. This point also shows that not only the Muslims in 1940 but also the British government in 1946 understood the reality of geographical remoteness in defining the borders of the future state of Pakistan. In that way, (like the Lahore Resolution) the Cabinet Mission Plan (also) envisaged two Pakistan and not one. By accepting the plan, the AIML also endorsed the same. Perhaps, the AIML preferred one or two conglomeration(s) of Muslim majority provinces to a combination of Muslim majority ‘units’ or ‘areas’ and to achieve that the AIML was ready to wait for another 10 years. In the Cabinet Mission Plan, there was a low risk of the denial of Pakistan (whether one or two). The division of India into two or three (independent) states was ingrained in the plan. The risk of division was after every 10 years. The plan also showed that both the AIML and the British government were convinced that the solution to the ills of united India lay in its division. The 10-year formula, which was enshrined in the plan, was also to edify the INC to rethink its politico-economic strategy towards the Muslims before another 10 years lapsed. Hence, the 10-year provision would have been a Damocles’ sword hanging over the head of the INC. By not accepting (one provision or another of) the Cabinet Mission Plan, the INC might have thought of obviating the division of united India. Even the Lahore Resolution and the Cabinet Mission Plan could not convince the INC that both the Muslims and the British government were thinking in terms of the division of India, owing to their own separate reasons. Though the division took place in 1947 but the hasty and enforced division of united India was a loss to both the Hindus and Muslims. The next community that was at loss was the Sikhs, as most of them had to take refuge in the Indian part of the province of Punjab. The hasty and enforced division was materialised through the Radcliffe Award of 1947, which sowed the seeds of permanent hatred between the newly founded states of Pakistan and India. The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com