The IS moving to Afghanistan

The loss of its core territory in Iraq and Syria would be a significant blow to the IS. The caliphate might officially survive in the remaining provinces, even though most are not really controlled by the IS affiliates, and largely exist in name only, but many of the trappings of a political state would be lost. Significantly outside of the core territory, there remains only one city, Derna, in Libya, which is actually controlled by the IS. The role of the Islamic state as an insurgency in Iraq and Syria, and as an international jihadist movement elsewhere would, however, threaten to continue.

Such an outcome is, by no means, a foregone conclusion. Even in the most optimistic scenario places, it needs at least 18 to 24 months in the future. Much can happen elsewhere, especially in North Africa, in general, and Afghanistan, in particular, in the meanwhile that could either accelerate the destruction of Islamic State or significantly mitigate the consequences of the loss of its current territory in Iraq and Syria. More importantly, would the IS tentacles reach Afghanistan? The answer is probably yes.

Moving to Afghanistan is a part of a larger repositioning as the Islamic State the IS loses ground, not only in Syria but also in Iraq where forces backed by the United States oust the group from sprawling. On the defensive in both countries, the group has been making preparations for retrenchment and survival and Afghanistan appears to be the ideal choice.

The long-term effects of the war against the IS, which the US is also battling in Iraq, Syria and, to a limited extent, Afghanistan are uncertain. The immediate question is what will happen after the IS fails completely in Syria. The IS fall will still leave pockets of resistance elsewhere in the country but the IS threat would be relatively weak and they can at best constitute a nuisance. But to bolster their legitimacy, the IS will have to choose those areas, which will provide it to strengthen its forces though this may take a long time.

The IS has also been laying the ideological groundwork to maintain its appeal in straitened circumstances. As it suffered on the battlefield in recent months, the group also began signalling that a drastic contraction or even a failure of its territorial proto-state would not spell defeat. The IS in Iraq had survived by fading into the desert after military defeat during the US occupation, only to re-emerge more formidably in Syria years later and eventually seize much of Iraq, including Mosul. Its regime is confident that terrains in Afghanistan would provide the safe haven for regrouping again. Move to Afghanistan could be just the latest example of the group’s pragmatic flexibility, propaganda savvy and staying power.

Almost exactly two years ago, the IS has announced that it was forming a new province not in Iraq or Syria, but far away in Afghanistan. Today, though it is estimated to have only between 1,000 and 3,000 fighters in the country, it is launching attacks including bombing the Pakistani consulate in Jalalabad, killing seven people. And it is building what former US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter called little nests in the country’s east. That worries Pakistan and China and the other regional players, which want to see the IS completely lose control of Afghanistan.

Whereas at one point the Islamic State was something that did not really exist in Afghanistan, but it threatened to exist. Or few thought it was something that maybe the Afghans were sort of ratcheting up the perception of the threat, in order to keep people engaged and interested in the issue, whatever, but it is a real problem now. There is an Islamic State presence in Afghanistan and they call it ISKP Islamic State in Khorasan Province. To the extent, the avowed goals are the creation of the caliphate and the return of the glory of Khorasan province which carries a historical importance. Some of the ISKP are coming from Pakistan and these are the former Taliban. Then the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, IMU pledged loyalty to the Islamic State some time ago, that was accepted and they were officially made members of the Islamic State. The IS is growing its base from the north of the country and then in from across the Pakistani border.

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are dealing with varying degrees of jihadist insurgencies. More significantly, the region is flanked by two hotbeds of jihadist activity — the Caucasus in the west and Afghanistan and Pakistan on the east. Russia fought two wars to control jihadist activity in Chechnya, and the threat of jihadist sponsored violence in Syria and Iraq spilling into the Caucasus is judged to be a major risk. More importantly after, Syria, the next biggest source of foreign jihadists for Russia is
from Afghanistan.

2017 is shaping up to be a potentially critical year for Afghanistan. The IS is rising there, the Taliban is gaining ground, and the stability of the Afghan government is deteriorating by the day. The US, China, Pakistan, and the Afghan government are currently holding talks aimed at bringing the Taliban to the table to try to negotiate an end to the war. And so the question is whether, the United States, are prepared to stand by with Afghanistan for that long and whether the Afghans will have the resolve. No one is hearing a lot of American policymakers or the military establishment being very alarmist about the Islamic State in Afghanistan. People talk about the Islamic State writ large, but specifically with respect to Afghanistan. The US, however, does not see this is an existential threat to Afghanistan.

The rise of the IS-Khorasan is one of the most interesting developments. It complicates the negotiations for the Taliban. They oppose the negotiations, and they are a big problem for Mullah Mansour and those who want to negotiate. They enable defections, make them easy, and make them costly. At the same time, it is interesting because the IS does not have the same linkages to Pakistan that the Afghan Taliban had, even though the IS includes many defectors from the Taliban. They quite specifically reject what they call the “yoke” that Pakistan has put on the Afghan Taliban, and they call the Afghan Taliban leadership traitors because of the close relationship with Pakistan. Moreover, the IS-Khorasan also has quite a few members of various Pakistani extremist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and members of TTP (Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan). So there is also a lot of resentment and hostility toward Pakistan.

Earlier this year, pro-IS slogans and graffiti even began to appear on walls in North Waziristan, Pakistan. Local Taliban groups there have considered joining the IS after becoming frustrated by the army’s almost total control in the region. The rise of the IS might make Pakistan be cooperative to some extent, but on the other hand, it will also reinforce Pakistan intelligence think tank that it is important to cultivate the Afghan Taliban as friends against the bigger danger of the IS.

 

The writer is a professor of psychiatry and consultant forensic psychiatrist in the UK. He can be contacted at fawad_shifa@yahoo.com