The civil-military relations in Pakistani context have been bedeviled by a lack of mutual trust and understanding due to a host of factors. The colonial flavor of a socially sequestered military weaned more on a colonial as opposed to a democratic diet had to be sedulously tempered through a civilian leadership possessing adequate charisma and political gravitas. The above end could not be achieved due to early death of the founder of the nation, and the removal from scene of the remaining political titans of the independence struggle. The result was the advent of totalitarianism with praetorians ruling the roost for a better part of our nearly seven decades of national existence. Why did all that happen? Some scholarly insights throw light on the delicate civil-military interaction. At the same time, as scholars like Laswell and Finer warned against a military proclivity for intervention in domestic politics that ultimately led towards a garrison state, others like Morris Janowitz and Peter Feaver recommended a strong civilian oversight over military policy formulation. Samuel Finer in his famous book, The Man on the Horseback warned of a military proclivity for power grab due to weaknesses of civilian institutions of governance and polity. In Pakistan due to a non-fortuitous concatenation of political developments the military assumed political power that stunted the growth of political leadership to the detriment of an already lopsided civil-military power balance. In post-Napoleonic era the military-centric power paradigm, ideally tailored for war fighting, relied on the famous Clausewitzian trinity of people, military, and government, all yoked together to achieve the desired objectives by attacking the rival centres of gravities. Due to political and technological advancements in current era, however, the Clausewitz’s classic confrontational paradigm has been challenged by scholars like Rebecca Schiff through her “Concordance Theory” of civil-military relations. According to her theory, smooth civil-military relations can be achieved through a cooperative relationship between the political elite, military and the citizenry. The strength in this age can therefore not be attained through confrontation but cooperation, be it the civil-military or the interstate equation. The lack of political will and intellectual depth amongst the civilian component of national leadership has stunted the growth of the civilian national security decision-making institutions resulting in an expertise gap between the civil and military components of the decision-making matrix. The gap could only be bridged through conscious efforts on part of politicians to acquire expertise and knowledge about military affairs through formal as well as informal education along with concomitant development of decision-making institutions. The need for a well-resourced national security directorate to provide institutionalised input for national security policy formulation is a case in point. When in countries like Pakistan the public aspirations and the patriotic sensibilities of the military combine in face of palpably weak and apathetic governance the result is a national discordance upending the “concordance” theory of Schiff. That discordance sometimes assumes the hues of threats to democracy in countries with weak political institutions. In order to bring a much needed concordance and balance between three elements i.e masses, politicians and the military it is necessary to establish some kind of a control over the military. The industrialised democracies through political evolution have developed two kinds of control over their militaries. The first is called “Objective Control,” a term coined in the US civil-military literature that means complete autonomy to the military in its professional sphere in return for complete obedience to the civilian government in political and national policy making spheres. The second is called “Subjective Control,” which means co-opting the military in civilian decision-making affairs as a hedge against military intervention in political affairs. The involvement and influence of Israeli military in civilian affairs is an example of Subjective Control where the head of the Israeli Defence Forces holds a cabinet seat during security crises. In the USA, an Objective Control by professionalising the military through measures like Gold Water Nicholas Act post 1987 was established. The Gold Water Act reorganised the US military chain of command around the commander-in-chief (president), secretary of defence, chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, and tri service combatant commanders in the field. Would Pakistan have its Gold Water Nicholas model through a reorganisation of its Higher Defence Organisation and having an efficacious chief of the defence staff heading three services? Would our ministry of defence and National Security Directorate be reorganised and resourced to be fully responsive and effective? A time has come for a complete rethinking and reorganising of our national security system as well as a higher defence organisation in order to enable civilians to both develop an expertise in military matters as well as to exercise effective oversight through potent and functional national security decision support institutions. These institutions include parliamentary committees, a properly staffed National Security Directorate, a reorganised ministry of defence, and a potent Joint Services Headquarters headed by a chief of the defence staff. The above may appear to be a tall order but is an idea whose time has come. The writer is a security expert and a PhD scholar at NUST. He can be reached at rwjanj@hotmail.com