On June 23-24, 2016, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) comprised of 48 member states held its plenary session at Seoul to discuss various issues. The most pressing one was whether to admit new member states that were not signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) agreed upon in 1997. It was quite obvious that India’s application for admission was to be discussed, as India’s Foreign Secretary Subramanhyam Jaishankar along with top disarmament expert Ambassador Amarjeet Singh Gill travelled to the South Korean capital at the eleventh hour for further lobbying efforts. However, the bone of contention remained on India’s NPT status and nuclear safety record, with China pushing hard to block its entry into the club in which it succeeded. The Chinese diplomats were adamant on their stance with Beijing refusing to budge even after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 45-minute meeting with Chinese President Xi Jingping in Tashkent on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) annual session. Moreover, other countries such as Turkey, Brazil and New Zealand also had some serious reservations on India’s application in the Seoul session with a total of nine countries rejecting the application. As for Pakistan, as expected, it played a pivotal role in lobbying against Indian efforts by recently pursuing hectic diplomatic activities with certain NSG member states, especially close allies such as China and Turkey. Furthermore, Pakistani diplomats also submitted an application for the country’s membership in order to be treated on an equal footing with India during the plenary session’s decision-making process. What do all of these things signify? Is China’s refusal based on its close relations with Pakistan, or were there some personal interests in play? Interestingly, India in 2008 had already attained the waiver it required for adopting the mechanism for utilising nuclear-grade materials. This waiver was acquired after Jaishankar, at that time the joint secretary in the ministry of foreign affairs — successfully convinced the United States to sign the Indo-US nuclear deal in March 2006. Hence, India’s NSG bid was largely based on being recognised as a legitimate nuclear state in which it essentially failed. In a recent India Today programme, To the Point, hosted by eminent Indian journalist Karan Thapar, former Indian minister for external affairs Salman Khurshid and Bharatya Janata Party’s (BJP) foreign policy expert Sheshadri Chari, also pointed out some important factors that included China’s own interest in not letting India join the NSG. This interest is based on the fear that the US was pushing for Indian membership to equate India and China. While in the past, Pakistan was often equated with India, but recent geopolitical and strategic dynamics imply that China is ostensibly using Pakistan as its personal satellite state based on the notion of a sphere of influence. In addition, it is also equally important not to miss the “de-hyphenating” factor, which essentially made India an “unofficially recognised” nuclear state by western powers that removed Pakistan as a symbiotic link. Hence, India’s bid for becoming an NSG member was hastily taken up by Indian government officials, which was as per most security, diplomatic and political experts, was quite unnecessary at the moment. On the other hand, regardless of Pakistan’s past proliferation record owing to the AQ Khan network, it did actually manage to significantly improve its nuclear security mechanism by adopting robust measures under the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) command. Furthermore, Pakistan’s nuclear safety record is also significantly better than that of India, as India’s nuclear safety record is marred by the assassination of some key nuclear scientists, along with nuclear material being stolen or misplaced. It is duly hoped that the NSG shall adopt non-discriminatory methods in the future when considering applications from the non-NPT nuclear states such as those based in South Asia. *