The test of India’s Advanced Air Defence (AAD) interceptor missile on Sunday raised security concerns in Pakistan, as the balance of power between the two states is being adversely affected by the build-up of India’s military technology. The technology will allow the Indian military to intercept incoming missiles, and this coupled with nuclear-capable K-4 Submarine will mean that India could have an effective second strike capability. In light of these concerns, Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz stated that Pakistan would consider upgrading its defence capability. For two states that have historically adopted hostile postures towards each other, locking horns over securitisation, and that too over nuclear weapons, should be cause for grave concern. There are different concerns that continue to shape the security policies of Pakistan and India. Nuclear technology for Pakistan is considered imperative for its security because it allows it to offset the Indian advantage in conventional military force. What Pakistan cannot match in numbers, it could gain through the threat of mass destruction of nuclear weapons, the keyword being ‘threat’. The mere idea of that becoming a reality is not even worth mentioning, and simply unthinkable. However, following the attack on Indian parliament in 2001 by non-state actors, the Indian military devised the ‘cold-start’ doctrine according to which a small intensity quick response by India, in case of an attack by terrorists believed by India to be supported by Pakistan such as the Mumbai carnage of 2008, would be initiated so that India could seize enough Pakistani territory to gain diplomatic leverage before the international community is able to respond. The ingenuity of the cold-start doctrine lay in the fact that the intensity of the attack would be small enough to deprive Pakistan of the justification to use full-scale nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s response to the cold-start doctrine was ‘full-spectrum’ deterrence, which involves the use of small-scale tactical nuclear weapons so that India is deterred from its cold-start doctrine. India accuses Pakistan of using non-state actors in perpetrating cross border terrorism. Some commentators claim that the reason Pakistan is allegedly able to do so is because of lack of consequences. Indian policy makers are of the view that the deterrence resulting from Pakistan’s nuclear technology emboldens the Pakistani state in its alleged role in using non-state actosr as part of its security policy. It is in this context that the cold-start doctrine was devised and, more recently, the launch of India’s AAD interceptor missile took place. It seems that Indian security policy makers believe that by sending the message to Pakistan that India has the capability of defending itself against a nuclear strike by Pakistan, it can offset the balance of power created by nuclear deterrence. Embroiled in this complicated debate of national security is the very real threat of a nuclear showdown. It is a terrifying reality that both Pakistan and India have their nuclear weapons pointing at each other, and given the acrimony between the two, it is not a far-fetched possibility that relations could regress to such a level that a nuclear war becomes a reality. It is indeed hard to believe that the public of both the states is oblivious to the mass destruction of nuclear weapons, as their sentiments, clothed in jingoistic nationalism, swell with pride over the possession of nuclear weapons by their states. It may be naïve to suggest that Pakistan and India should adopt nuclear disarmament as such a move would go against their security policy. However, for the sake of eliminating the existential threat that nuclear weapons hold for both Pakistan and India, the two states need to move forward on their issues and try to resolve them so that nuclear weapons are no longer required to deter each other. It is indeed true that peace between the two states is the best guarantee of security of both Pakistan and India.*