Pakistan’s importance to the United States has been one that has adopted many forms in light of changing conditions. So when the former CIA station chief in Islamabad, Robert L Grenier said in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the US that the lawmakers should take into account US long term interests in Pakistan that dwarf those in Afghanistan, he was talking about one such possible shift. With India and China on their way to becoming powerful economies, Pakistan’s strategic importance as the country that is geographically placed in the middle of this changing geopolitical environment has increased for the US. And this needs to be viewed in its historic context in which Pakistan has played the role of a country linked very closely to the US, but in an uneasy partnership for which both countries had their own reasons. During the Cold War, Pakistan wanted US military aid in order to arm itself against the supposed existential threat from India, while the US wanted a regional partner in containing communism. While the US weapons that entered Pakistan came under Pakistan’s agreement that they were for containing communism, the US knew that they were actually for Pakistan’s defence against India, which it chose to ignore because of its own need to have Pakistan on board the anticommunist camp. Between the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11, 2001, the strained relations between the US and Pakistan were because the communist threat did not exist anymore, and therefore, the absence of any strategic reason for the US militated against turning a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear programme. However, 9/11 marked a qualitative shift in Pakistan-US relationship as Pakistan become a frontline line state in the war against terrorism, and once again, US aid flowed in Pakistan as a result of this imperative. Underlying all of this were hardheaded calculations from both sides. Political Islam that became a threat after 9/11 was in fact supported and in some cases even propped up by the US during the Cold War to act as a bulwark against communism. Hence talk of a ‘moral imperative’ dictating US foreign policy against militant Islam now is akin to indulging in naïvety. The only reason the US waged war against militant Islam was because it had started to rear its ugly head on US soil. All of this is not to say that the fight against terrorism is not important. In fact, peace and stability in not only Pakistan but also the entire region is contingent upon the elimination of terrorism. However, the point being made is that the grounds on which the US acts sanctimoniously and sermonises Pakistan to ‘do more’ are very shaky. Pakistan on its part needs to realise the shifting geopolitical environment and adjust its foreign policy accordingly. Old calculations of foreign threats have to be done away and replaced with a policy that is holistic in nature, which takes into account the myriad complexities of present times. To begin with, Pakistan would have to reconcile itself with the increased importance of India for the US, on account of India simply being a much larger country. Moreover, China’s fast ascent towards global economic dominance and the fluid relationship between China, the US, and India leaves Pakistan in situation in which hard alliances are no longer an option. If China and the US can have a political rivalry, much like China and India, but remain tremendously big trading partners, there is no need for Pakistan to isolate itself with either the US or India, on account of the two countries’ increasing closeness towards each other. Perhaps, Pakistan should look at trade as a means of improving relations with its neighbours, particularly India, so that security calculations no longer have the significance that they would in a hostile neighbourhood, and Pakistan could work towards its development goals instead. *